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<C-AB>Abstract: The target article diagnoses a dominance of liberal viewpoints with little 
evidence, promotes a conservative viewpoint without defining it, and wrongly projects the 
U.S. liberal-conservative spectrum to the whole field of social psychology. Instead, we 
propose to anticipate and reduce mixing of theorizing and ideology by using definitions that 
acknowledge divergence in perspective, and promote representative sampling and 
observation of the field, as well as dialogical publication. 
 
<C-Text begins> 
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We agree with Duarte and colleagues in two regards: Yes, there are problems with under-
representation of some viewpoints among academics in social psychology, and, yes, theory 
and ideology are occasionally mixed in theory building and testing. However, we do not think 
their examples of under-representation and ideology-driven social psychological research are 
typical of the field. We also believe their proposals are neither necessary nor sufficient. 
 
 We question three basic assumptions of the target article: Are “liberal” ideologies 
biasing social psychological theorizing more than other, more “conservative” ideologies? Is 
there solid evidence for under-representation of conservatives? Would conservative 
viewpoints render social psychology more representative in any meaningful way? 
 
 Social psychologists often hold an individualist conceptualization of human nature, 
and neglect relational and collective self-aspects. This fits the conservative viewpoint better 
than more liberal or left worldviews. The same is true for the neglect of culture’s role in 
human evolution, leading to sometimes questionable biologistic hypotheses in evolutionary 
psychology. Together, these have probably done more harm to psychological theorizing than 
the prominence of some liberal ideology in some specific social psychological theories that 
are rightly pointed out by the target article. 
 
 The evidence for the claims of under-representation is rather weak. One of the target 
article’s data points is a show of hands at the 2011 Society for Personality and Social 
Psychology (SPSP) meeting. One of us was present at this occasion, but could not raise a 
hand because the categorization used did not fit the political orientation of this researcher. 
Better investigations of researchers’ standing on various issues would be needed before such 
claims of homogeneity could be made. 
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 The target article’s stated goal is to promote non-liberal worldviews in general, but in 
practice it relies solely on contrasting liberals and conservatives within the political spectrum 
of the United States. It is troubling that the conservative viewpoint, in contrast to the liberal 
narrative, is never properly characterized or defined. Historic changes in the U.S. 
conservative ideology since the 1980s or today’s fissures in the conservative political 
movement of the United States are completely ignored. It is also surprising that U.S. political 
worldviews are generalized pars pro toto to the whole field of social psychology. Contrasting 
liberalism and conservatism is misleading in at least four ways: 
<NL> 
1. Even from a U.S. perspective, conservatism may not be the most important missing 
viewpoint or group – there are also non-voters, various immigrant groups whose ideology fits 
neither conservatism nor liberalism, and people who do not categorize themselves as either 
conservatives or liberals, including some of the authors of the target article. 
2. From a European perspective, the differences between U.S. conservatives and U.S. liberals 
often seem marginal, and often both seem to the right of the political spectrum. For instance, 
many representatives of U.S. liberals and conservatives alike are much more skeptical 
towards the idea of a welfare state than are the majority of Europeans. 
3. From a global perspective, using political orientation as a criterion would in fact require 
the recruitment of far more diverse viewpoints, such as environmentalists, pacifists, 
communists, fascists, separatists, jihadists, and so forth. People from North America and 
Western Europe are in many respects very exceptional and not representative of the majority 
of cultures (Henrich et al. 2010b). 
4. Political orientation is only one of a number of dimensions by which to categorize people, 
including academics. This is briefly acknowledged in the target article, but other dimensions 
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such as ethnicity, race, and gender are reduced to demographic diversity and dismissed as 
adding nothing beyond the conservative-liberal dimension. This is clearly too narrow. 
Cultural psychology has accumulated ample evidence for the diverse psychologies shaped by 
socialization. 
<NL ends> 
In sum, the heterogeneity of today’s societies in the United States and the West in general, as 
well as globally, undermines the basic assumption that especially conservative viewpoints are 
needed for a more representative social psychology. 
 
 Political diversity as such does not prevent the mixing of ideology with theory. 
Nothing is to be gained from counterbalancing well-established but allegedly liberally biased 
theories with conservatively biased theories. Instead, social psychologists need to distinguish 
between their roles as researchers and political citizens (Waldzus et al. 2012). Perspective 
dependency is unavoidable and has therefore to be accounted for in the theoretical and 
empirical process. The following measures can help achieve this. 
 
 Define psychological constructs such that they incorporate diverging perspectives 
where appropriate. For example, Mummendey and Wenzel (1999) define discrimination as 
“an ingroup’s subjectively justified unequal, usually disadvantageous, evaluation or treatment 
of an outgroup, that the latter (or an outside observer) would deem unjustified” (p. 159). 
 
 Define the target population, also with the help of sociological and anthropological 
literature, and seek to understand it before testing hypotheses. The goal is to adapt 
manipulations, hypotheses, and measures to divergent perspectives. Useful methods include 
observation, interviews, and surveys with open questions. Anticipate misunderstandings 
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between subcultures (Rozin 2001). This requires changes in the culture of editorial decision 
making and reviewing to value and publish descriptive data that cannot (yet) be theoretically 
explained or predicted. 
 
 Establish and promote publication formats that reinforce or even require debate (such 
as the dialogical publication scheme used by Behavioral and Brain Sciences), across 
disciplinary boundaries as well. The goal is to help discover blind-spots and mistakes caused 
by a too narrow perspective. 
 
 The target article could have provided a great service to the field if it had 
characterized the pitfalls of the liberal viewpoint properly and promoted concepts of diversity 
beyond it in general. However, by promoting an undefined conservative viewpoint as the 
main missing perspective, we are afraid that the target article does more harm than good: It 
proposes a pseudo-solution that could create an illusion of objectivity through “diversity” 
while preventing the field from taking effective necessary steps to overcome its actual 
ideological biases. 
<C-Text ends> 
 
[COMP: DO NOT SET REFERENCES FROM HERE; USE CONSOLIDATED 
REFERENCES FILE] 
<RFT>References [Beate Seibt, Sven Waldzus, Thomas W. Schubert & Rodrigo Brito] [BS] 
<refs> 
Henrich, J., Heine, S. J. & Norenzayan, A. (2010b) The weirdest people in the world? 
Behavioral and Brain Sciences 33:61–135.   [BS] 
6 
 
Mummendey, A. & Wenzel, M. (1999) Social discrimination and tolerance in intergroup 
relations: Reactions to intergroup difference. Personality and Social Psychology 
Review 3:158–74.   [BS] 
Rozin, P. (2001) Social psychology and science: Some lessons from Solomon Asch. 
Personality and Social Psychology Review 5:2–14.   [BS] 
Waldzus, S., Schubert, T. W. & Paladino, M.-P. (2012) Are attitudes the problem, and do 
psychologists have the answer? Relational cognition underlies intergroup relations. 
Behavioral and Brain Sciences 35:449–50.   [BS] 
<refs end> 
 
